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Abstract 
 
The unusual mixed public-private structure of the urban bus 
market in the metropolitan area of Barcelona provides an 
interesting context in which to analyze the management 
challenges and opportunities of the partial privatization of 
public services. Initiatives used by the public regulator to 
promote competition for contracts, such as short term 
concessions to private contractors and the removal of entry 
barriers, have considerable potential for improving efficiency 
and quality. The growth in the share of routes managed by 
private firms in recent years shows that privatization is a 
credible threat that may well stimulate improved performance 
among public managers. The type of reform implemented in 
Barcelona is of interest to all metropolitan areas large enough 
to operate under constant returns to scale regimes, and 
suitable for potential concessions of routes in segregated areas 
inside the metropolitan area, so as not to miss out on the 
benefits of economies of density. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Local bus transportation in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona is a mixed system in which one 
public and several private firms supply the service in different areas. Transports Metropolitans de 
Barcelona (TMB, henceforth) is a firm that is fully owned by the local government and operates 
daily urban routes in downtown Barcelona and the immediate surroundings, representing 
around 60% of the route length in the metropolitan area. While TMB offers transportation 
services in downtown Barcelona, a group of private concessionaires connect the suburban 
areas with the city centre and operate all nightly routes. A local regulatory agency, the Entitat 
Metropolitana del Transport (EMT, henceforth) is responsible for awarding and regulating 
concessions.  
 
Mixed public-private systems in which public and private operators coexist within a 
jurisdiction are quite unusual in the European Union. In fact, most European metropolitan 
areas and large cities make a choice between purely public and purely private forms of delivery. 
Urban bus services are private in almost all cities in England and most cities in France (Savage, 
1993; Dárbera, 1995; Labridge and Sealey, 2000; Amaral et al., 2006). On the other hand, in 
most cities in Germany, Italy and Spain the service is provided by public firms. Competition 
between public and private suppliers within a city has made some headway in the Scandinavian 
countries, which are generally more given to introducing competition in product and services 
markets. This means that Barcelona is the only large metropolitan area in Europe with a large-
scale mixed public-private service organization.1 This regulatory strategy is not common even 
in the US, although mixed public-private systems operate many local services in that country 
(Warner and Hefetz, 2008), such as residential solid waste collection and water distribution 
(Warner and Bel, 2008).  
 
The objective of this paper is to examine Barcelona’s transportation system taking into account 
the reform in its governance and regulation. Reforms of this kind have not been applied in 
other large cities and have not been analyzed so far in the literature. Our study explores the 
main features of the city’s regulatory regime: the coexistence of public and private firms, the 
competitive tendering process, and the incentive regulation applied to concessionaires. We 
thus provide a thorough analysis of a regulatory system applied in a large metropolitan area. 
 
Our study expands on the literature on partial privatization, which suggests that the mixed 
public-private provision of bus services may reduce scale economies but helps to discipline 
operators. The presence of a public operator gives the regulator information about costs and 
demands that is useful for overseeing private operators, and may also help to protect 
passengers’ interests in areas with thin demand. By contrast, private firms are useful to identify 
the inefficiencies of public firms and to moderate the demands of public employees. We use 
the literature on monopoly regulation to explain the options available to transportation 
                                                     
1 Between 1985 and 1994 public and private bus companies coexisted in the metropolitan area of 
London (UK) (See Amaral, Saussier and Yvrande-Billon, 2006). The main difference vis-à-vis Barcelona 
is that in London public operators participated in competitive biddings with private presence.  
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regulators in order to enhance service provision and concessionaires’ performance. We 
emphasize the need to remove entry barriers in the tendering process so as to increase 
competition for the concessions, and to use incentives and penalization mechanisms so as to 
improve concessionaire efficiency. 
 
So our study presents and discusses the management strategy applied by EMT to the 
Barcelona transportation system. The main shortcoming of the approach is that TMB retains a 
great deal of autonomy with regard to EMT, which makes the regulation of the public firm 
difficult. In spite of this, EMT has been quite effective in increasing competition for the 
market and in promoting the efficiency of private operators. The progressive elimination of 
entry barriers in the tendering process has made the market more competitive and has allowed 
more firms to participate. Nevertheless, in recent years no substantial alternation has been 
observed in the operation of concessions. Our understanding of this result is that EMT uses 
competitive pressure to discipline private incumbents. As regards the regulation of 
concessions, we explain that the introduction of incentive mechanisms in contract design 
promotes the operator’s efforts to increase efficiency without affecting the quality of the 
service. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical discussion 
of how partial privatization, competition and regulation can be introduced in urban 
transportation. Section 3 presents the case of Barcelona, as an example of how these 
theoretical recommendations can be implemented in a market. Finally, the last section presents 
our conclusions.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
This section analyzes three key regulatory aspects that determine the performance of operators 
in the market. First, we discuss the merits of a mixed public-private system for enhancing 
market regulation. Next, we explain how the use of a competitive tendering process to choose 
the concessionaires might force firms to reveal true information about their costs and thus 
increase social welfare. Finally, we describe some regulatory instruments that can be used in 
bus transportation to increase the efficiency of concessionaires and to reduce the subsidies 
given to them. 
 
2.1 Public-private systems 
 
The provision of many utilities like telecommunications, electricity, water and transportation 
entail important scale and density economies which mean that it is efficient to give the 
exclusive rights to operate the service to a single firm. In the case of local bus transportation, 
however, the literature finds that the provision of this service does not imply significant scale 
economies. As a consequence, it is possible to divide the metropolitan area into separate routes 
or regions and to award them to different concessionaires to facilitate the use of benchmarking 
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techniques. What is more, in this context public and private firms might operate different 
concessions. Let us deal with each of these issues in turn. 
 
A classical dilemma in the provision of public services is the impossibility of simultaneously 
reaching both productive and allocative efficiency when there are increasing returns of scale in 
production. Bearing this in mind, a key issue when organizing bus transportation is to assess 
whether scale and density economies are sufficiently important to prevent the fragmentation of 
the market into different concessions.  
 
A number of papers have used multivariate analysis to examine the existence of scale and 
density economies in the field of urban bus transportation (Table 1).2 Anna Matas and José L. 
Raymond (1998) analyzed the costs of nine firms in Spain’s largest cities for the period 1983-
1995. Their results indicate the existence of substantial density economies but constant 
economies of scale (they also report decreasing returns to scale for the largest firms in the 
sample). Massimo Filippini and Paola Prioni (2003) reach a similar conclusion when analyzing 
a sample of 34 Swiss firms in the period 1991-1995. Their empirical analysis shows the 
existence of substantial economies of density, and constant returns to scale. For Switzerland as 
well, Mehdi Farsi, Aurelio Fetz and Filippini (2007) analyze a sample of 16 multimodal 
transportation firms (trams, trolleys and motor buses) with data for the period 1985-1997. 
Their analysis indicates the existence of increasing returns to scale for most firms, although 
most of them are small.  
 
Table 1. Empirical multivariate results for returns to scale in local bus transportation service  
 
Study Country Functional form Results on scale returns 
Viton (1981) United 
Kingdom 
Trans-logarithmic Increasing returns to density. 
Matas and Raymond 
(1998) 
Spain Trans-logarithmic Increasing returns to density. 
Constant returns to scale, with 
decreasing returns for the largest firms. 
Filippini and Prioni 
(2003) 
Switzerland Trans-logarithmic Increasing returns to density. 
Constant returns to scale 
Farsi, Fetz and Filippini  
(2007) 
Switzerland Quadratic Increasing returns to scale 
Source: Elaborated by the authors. 
 
The results of these empirical studies have important implications for the management of 
local bus transportation systems. The fact that returns to scale are on average constant, and 
that some large firms even show decreasing returns to scale, implies that no scale benefits are 
lost when creating several concessions in a large metropolitan area.3 As in the case of 
                                                     
2 Shaw-Er, Chiang and Chen (2005) and De Borger and Kerstens (2006) review this literature, which  
began with Viton (1981). Although to a lesser extent, there is some empirical evidence available for the 
case of bus regional services (see Cambini and Filippini, 2003). 
3 Fraquelli et al. (2004) find economies of scope associated with urban-intercity diversification, 
suggesting that the merging of neighboring firms could improve local networks. David Hensher (2003) 
analyzes the effects of the contract area in competitive tendering procedures. Larger areas can reduce 
competition but some scale economies can be obtained for small firms (fewer than 100 buses). 
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Barcelona, competition between different providers can be introduced at the urban-section 
level.  
 
Once we accept the potential advantages of creating several concessions for operating the bus 
service in a city, the next question to analyze is whether it makes sense to provide the services 
through public firms or rather to allow the participation of private firms in the market. In 
recent decades, a number of papers have shown the benefits of privatizing bus operators. 
Ginés De Rus and Gustavo Nombela (1997) found that public firms in Spain use 30 per cent 
more employees than private firms to serve the same km-vehicle, and pay wages that are 18 per 
cent higher, a striking result if we bear in mind that labor costs account for a substantial part of 
bus operator costs. Ian Savage (1993) and Peter R. White (1997) reported significant cost 
reductions after the privatization of local bus operators in the UK, mainly due to wage 
reductions. In Switzerland, Filippini and Prioni (2003) found that private operators are more 
efficient in providing regional services, and Fumitoshi Mizutani and Takuya Urakami (2002) 
obtained similar results for Japan.4 The downside is that it is difficult to obtain reliable 
information to regulate private firms. Therefore, politicians should only contemplate 
privatization when the costs gains offset the regulatory burden created by the asymmetries of 
information between the operators and the regulator. 
 
Since the 1980s many European countries have implemented significant changes in the 
organizational and regulatory framework of their bus services under the auspices of the 
European Commission (European Commission, 2005 and 2007). The UK, France and Spain 
have all embarked on liberalizing the market in an attempt to reap the benefits of privatization. 
But other hybrid organizational forms are gaining importance in the bus sector, such as mixed 
firms, where public and private sector share ownership, or mixed public-private systems, where 
public and private firms coexist in the same territorial jurisdiction. 
 
A mixed firm is one way to escape the classical public-private delivery dilemma. Ownership is 
divided between the local government and the private sector, and the firm operates entirely 
within the framework of private commercial law. In Spain, this formula has been applied 
extensively in solid waste and water services, the private partners tending to be large firms with 
a well-established reputation in the sector (Warner and Bel, 2008).5 Usually, the private partner 
manages the day-to-day operations of the firm, whereas the government retains the control of 
the firm’s longer-term planning activities (Bel and Fageda, 2010).  
 
In the US the term “mixed public-private system” has a very different meaning. It is 
understood as a market organization system in which several public and private firms provide 
the service within the same local jurisdiction. This system does not affect the structure of firms 
                                                     
4 Lee and Rivosplata (2001) also obtain this conclusion for New Zealand and Chile.  
5 Yvrande-Billon (2006) and Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) describe the presence of these semi-public 
firms in France. They report that 21 per cent of French local authorities choose this form of provision 
and that public-private partnership via a semi-public company is the worst organizational choice a local 
authority can make in terms of technical efficiency. 
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but partially privatizes the organization of service delivery at a spatial and institutional level: 
mixed delivery does not occur at the firm level. 
 
Mixed public-private provision allows governments to pursue different types of objective: 1) 
they can compare firms’ production processes and costs, while still retaining direct 
involvement in service delivery (Miranda and Lerner, 1995; Shleifer, 1995). The most efficient 
companies obtain better conditions, and inefficient ones are penalized (Armstrong and 
Sappington, 2006). Therefore, a mixed system reduces the costs of regulation6; 2) by managing 
competitive contracting processes between the different firms, a mixed public-private system 
increases the number of available service providers in the jurisdiction and thus fosters 
competition in the local market (Ballard and Warner, 2000); 3) The mixed system facilitates 
public-private cooperation in service provision when public firms are responsible for some 
parts of the service and private firms take care of other aspects (Warner and Hefetz, 2008). For 
example, a public firm can serve within-downtown routes while private firms can serve center-
periphery routes. 
 
Another advantage of mixed systems is that public firm managers and labor unions may feel 
threatened by the possibility of privatization; the mixed system can modify their concerns for 
efficiency and reduce the likelihood of strikes (Hatry, 1999; Dijkgraaf and Gradus, 2007). This 
is especially important in countries like Spain where, as several papers have shown, the 
inefficiency gap between private and public bus companies is associated with labor factor 
management. Indeed, during the TMB workers’ strike in late 2007 and early 2008, one of the 
local government’s negotiation tools was the threat that they would award new routes in 
downtown Barcelona to private companies. The possibility of privatization was raised by the 
government to enhance its bargaining power: the threat was made more credible by the 
presence of a large number of private firms already operating in the city’s metropolitan area. 
 
To summarize: mixed systems can increase competition in the local market, provide 
information on the nature and the costs of the service (thus reducing information asymmetries 
and transaction costs) and ensure government capacity to guarantee failsafe service in case of 
contract failure (Warner and Bel, 2008). 
 
2.2 Competition under partial privatization 
 
In the bus industry, density economies make it inefficient to introduce competition at the route 
level. In fact, it is technically more efficient to have only one company operating each route. 
However, public authorities may still tender the concession of routes and award them to the 
                                                     
6 Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2003) analyze the use of yardstick competition in the Norwegian bus 
market. They compare two main types of contracts: individually bargained contracts and contracts 
based on a yardstick model. They show that the latter significantly reduces operating costs.
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firms asking for the lowest subsidy, or to those obtaining a higher score when considering 
several aspects such as the price, the coverage or the quality.7 
 
The attractiveness of tender systems is that bidders have the incentive to reveal their true costs 
and enable the regulator to select the best offer. When this occurs, tenders may replicate the 
results of a competitive market, provided that information is good enough and a sufficient 
number of firms are available to enter the bid. Of course, competitive bidding is less effective 
when the regulator has other concerns besides the price (or the cost) of the service being 
offered. When public authorities also care about other quantitative and qualitative attributes of 
the service it is difficult to determine the winning bidder. Moreover, when the definition of the 
service is not sufficiently clear, competitive tendering may result in the selection of the most 
opportunistic bidder, the one that is most aware of contractual blanks that it can exploit (Bajari 
et al., 2003; Yvrande-Billon, 2006). 
 
According to Antonio Estache and Andrés Gómez-Lobo (2005), there are several ways of 
tendering a route: contracts can be tendered based on a multivariable selection criterion, which 
includes the fare offered by firms as well as quality variables8, or they can be awarded to the 
firm that requests the lowest subsidy. In this case, the firm receives a subsidy that covers the 
estimated revenue shortfall compared with costs. Firms may or may not retain revenues from 
fares, and this determines their transfers. If a firm's revenues do not depend on revenues from 
passengers (which is dependent on passenger numbers), it will be less interested in attracting 
customers. 
 
In spite of this, many studies have shown that competitive bidding may imply problems that 
make it difficult to introduce efficiency in the market (Williamson, 1976; Littlechild, 2002). 
Auctions become less attractive when few firms participate in the process or when there is the 
possibility of collusion. The larger the number of firms in the auction, the lower the declared 
costs and, as a consequence, the subsidy to be paid. The case of London confirms this: Miguel 
Amaral, Stéphane Saussier and Anne Yvrande-Billon (2009) found a high negative correlation 
between the number of bidders and the cost of service during the years of public-private 
coexistence. Yvrande-Billon (2006) also reports that in the French market between 1996 and 
1999 companies consulted each other in order to divide up the market between them. 
 
Another important limitation of tendering systems is that contracts are incomplete when there 
is uncertainty about the evolution of key aspects affecting the sector. In this regard, one of the 
most important deficiency of auctions is “Williamson’s Transformation”. Oliver Williamson 
(1976) noted that after overcoming the competitors and making sunk investments, the 
                                                     
7 Demsetz (1968) showed that competitive tendering is an alternative to natural monopoly regulation 
when authorities use ex ante competition to better regulate the winner of the concession in the second 
stage. Several tendering processes can be used to allocate scarce resources like spectrum or to choose 
the provider of a service. Prats and Valletti (2003) offer a detailed comparison of auctions and “beauty 
contests”. 
8 This does not eradicate all the problems. An incumbent operator might oversupply in the frequency 
dimension so as not to leave gaps that rivals could enter. 
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relationship between the government and the concessionaire becomes a bilateral monopoly 
and the absence of competition has a negative effect on the achievements made by competitive 
auction. 
 
Several strategies have been proposed in order to mitigate this problem. First, in order to avoid 
Williamson’s transformation, regulators can award short-term contracts subject to recurrent 
auctions. Short contracts reduce market risks and allow the regulator to adjust the contract to 
changes in technology and demand. However, when operators need to incur in important sunk 
costs, longer time horizons may be required to ensure dynamic efficiency. In these 
circumstances, negotiations are likely, and concessionaires can engage in some opportunistic 
behavior. 
 
Finally, several authors have highlighted the consequences of competitive tendering for the 
market structure. In the UK, Christopher Nash (2005) describes the extensive consolidation of 
companies and the dominance of the industry by the three large groups. Similar results are 
identified by Gunnar Alexandersson et al. (1998) for Sweden and by Terje Mathisen and Gisle 
Solvoll (2008) for Norway. These studies show that the uncertainty about competitive 
tendering probably increases cross-ownership and reduces the number of bus firms. The 
reduced number of firms may be a problem in a competitive process. However, the change of 
the industry costs structure may also reflect the increase in efficiency, although scale 
economies are not very important in this activity. 
 
Another reason why tendering might not be effective is that there might not be enough 
participants in the tender to guarantee sufficient competition. Regulators might be interested in 
reducing entry barriers in the market to increase participation in the tendering process and to 
reduce the amount of subsidies granted. According to William Baumol (1982), in a perfect 
contestable market, the threat of competition from potential entrants disciplines incumbent 
firms to reduce their prices and obtain normal returns.9 In the bus industry, regulators can 
apply a range of strategies to increase the contestability of the market. For example, in 
Barcelona and in many French cities local authorities maintain the ownership of the 
infrastructures and tender only the provision of the service. Regulators offer concessionaires 
essential equipment such as coaches and buses in order to reduce their initial investments. This 
strategy reduces entry barriers and makes the market more contestable. However, incumbents 
and potential entrants never have exactly the same opportunities since the former are better 
informed regarding assets, quality and demand features than their rivals. Another strategy for 
increasing participation is to use a route-by-route tender instead of network tendering. In this 
case, competition can be expected to be high; however, it may imply higher coordination costs 
(Boitani and Cambini, 2006). 
 
The literature reports ambiguous results regarding the relationship between competitive 
tendering and cost efficiency. Isotope (1998) estimates that the use of competitive bidding in 
                                                     
9 Shepherd (1984) and Baumol (1987) explain the conditions of the markets and the firms that make a 
market contestable. 
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Europe can reduce costs by 35% with market fragmentation – breaking up public monopoly – 
and privatization.10 John Preston (2005) considers that tenders typically give unit costs that are 
around 20% lower than in the case of an unchallenged public monopoly operator. Analyzing 
the tendering process in London initiated in 1985, David Kennedy (1996) reports that the 
estimated cost savings from tendering were 18 per cent from 1987 to 1992. Considerable cost 
savings were achieved through reductions in labor costs, due to improved working practices 
and increased productivity. In spite of this, Hensher and Ian Wallis (2005) show that contract 
prices in London in the five years up to 2000/01 increased at an average rate of around 10 per 
cent per annum, while in the rest of Great Britain the rate of increase was somewhat higher. 
Factors that contributed to this increase are higher standards (such as low floor buses) and 
input prices.  
 
Analyzing the use of competitive bidding in France since 1993, Yvrande-Billon (2006) 
concludes that it did not lead to better performance, due to the lack of transparency of the 
attribution processes and the limited monitoring capabilities of local authorities. Indeed, since 
1993 the unit costs of service provision have continued to increase. An explanation of this is 
that French local authorities collect bids from pre-qualified firms with whom it enters in 
separate negotiations in order to determine the detailed contractual terms. Finally, it chooses 
the winner, which is not necessarily the most efficient. In spite of this, when analyzing the 
period 1995-2002 Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) show that private operators outperform 
public ones in terms of technical efficiency.  
 
Results of the applications of tendering processes in Italy have been poor. Assessing the effects 
of the competitive tendering processes implemented in this country since 1998, Andrea Boitani 
and Carlo Cambini (2006) report that there were few participants, that incumbents were able to 
gain the franchise almost everywhere, and that subsidy savings were in many cases negligible.  
 
In summary, as in other sectors, privatization may bring about initial cost reductions but costs 
can increase over time (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). 
 
2.3 Regulation of concessionaires 
 
The regulation of bus concessions does not differ greatly from regulation of other 
monopolies.11 Regulators establish the prices and the quality of the services, define the 
relationship between operators, and supervise compliance with the conditions of the 
concessions. The design of these regulations is essential to attract the interest of firms in a 
tendering process: firms want a clear, stable regulatory regime that allows them to estimate the 
costs and revenues of concessions. 
                                                     
10 Similar results have been obtained from the tendering process in other network industries such as 
telecommunications, electricity, water and sewerage. See Wellenius (2002) and Bel and Calzada (2009). 
11 Several articles have studied how governments increase their regulatory presence when deregulating 
markets and privatizing public monopolies (Albalate, Bel and Fageda, 2009; Gómez-Ibañez, 2003)
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An important aspect of contracts established with private operators is the degree of risk-
sharing. Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) explain that there are essentially two types of risk in 
the bus sector: "the production risk", associated with the production costs of a fixed level of 
service, independent of the volume of passengers, and the "revenue risk", associated with the 
sale of transport services. In France, the recognition of these risks gives rise to three different 
contracts: net cost contracts; gross cost contracts; and management contracts (Table 2).  
 
Table 2. Type of contracts in urban bus services in France  
 Type of contract 
 Net cost contract Gross cost contract Management contract 
Risk burden Both product and revenue 
risks are borne by the 
transport company 
The production risk is taken 
by the transport company 
while the revenue risk is 
borne by the local authority
Both production and 
revenue risks are borne by 
the local authority instead of 
the transport company 
Payment The operator only receives 
a subsidy equal to the 
difference between the 
anticipated total operating 
costs and revenues 
The operator pays an 
agreed price for the 
production of a fixed 
amount of services 
The private operator receives 
a remuneration that is 
independent of its 
performance 
Percentage of 
contracts (2002) 
51% 27% 21% 
Source: Based on information provided in Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) 
 
Roy and Yvrande-Billon (2007) report a downward trend in the presence of management 
contracts in France in recent years. In addition, they show that operators under management 
contracts exhibit a higher level of technical inefficiency than operators under other contract 
arrangements. Private operators regulated with gross cost contracts have the highest efficiency 
scores. However, they emphasize that, although statistically significant, the performance 
differentials between the various regulatory schemes are slight. Therefore, only marginal 
improvements in technical efficiency are to be expected from regulatory changes. 
 
More generally, contracts with bus operators must indicate the mechanism used to regulate 
prices and quality, the technology that can be used and the coverage that must be attained by 
the operators. One advantage of having several concessions in the same municipality is that 
monopoly regulations can be complemented with benchmarking techniques.  
 
The concessions also define the duration of the contracts. A short contract period reduces 
market risks and allows the regulator to adjust the contracts to the changes in technology and 
in demand. Moreover, consumers benefit more immediately from the productivity gains 
generated by operators. However, the longer the contract, the greater the investment 
incentives for reducing cost. The existence of this trade-off makes the definition of the 
duration of the contract a complex task: Longer time horizons may enhance dynamic 
efficiency but may increase subsidies to firm. In order to avoid this problem, Eduardo Engel, 
Ronald Fisher and Alexander Galetovic (2001) have suggested using an auction design where 
the regulator fixes the prices and firms bid for the Least-Present-Value of Revenues. In this 
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context, the duration of the concessions can be adjusted according to the operator’s revenues. 
This type of concession is useful when there is uncertainty about the demand for the service. 
 
3. Barcelona’s Regulatory Model 
  
In this section we analyze the mixed public-private system used in the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona and the regulatory instruments designed to monitor the concessionaires. This 
analysis highlights some of the achievements of the Entitat Metropolitana del Transport (EMT) in 
increasing efficiency in the market in accordance with the theoretical background described 
above, and also identifies the areas that still present weaknesses and provide room for further 
management improvements. 
 
EMT was created in 1987 to regulate the provision of bus transportation in 18 municipalities 
in Barcelona’s metropolitan area, an urban continuum of 331.5 sq. km. with a population of 
2.8 million people.12 EMT’s governing body is formed by representatives of all the 
municipalities covered by the service. Representatives are appointed by each municipal council. 
The city of Barcelona appoints 11 representatives, municipalities with more than 100,000 
inhabitants appoint three representatives, and municipalities with populations below 100,000 
appoint one representative. 
 
In Barcelona, metro and bus fares are integrated and subsidized to ensure affordability. EMT’s 
responsibilities are the management, planning and coordination of mass public surface 
transportation services. It also regulates the city’s metro network, which is operated by the 
public firm Ferrocarril Metropolità de Barcelona SA (Barcelona Metropolitan Railways).13  Public 
transportation services in the metropolitan area of Barcelona are funded via a range of 
mechanisms: (1) A management contract with bus and metro operators; (2) A transportation 
tax; and (3) Transfers from other local institutions in the area. 
 
3.1 Mixed public-private delivery 
Surface transportation in Barcelona is organized as a mixed system. EMT regulates public and 
private bus operators. The publicly-owned firm Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB) 
operates urban day-time routes in the city of Barcelona and its vicinity. TMB absorbs 75% of 
passengers, 62% of km of service and 70% of the vehicles (see Tables 3 and 4). The area not 
covered by TMB is operated by a group of much smaller private firms. Generally these firms 
connect the suburbs and the downtown area and also operate urban routes at night. Routes are 
grouped in districts and operated monopolistically for the period defined in the concession 
contracts. 
 
                                                     
12 As stressed by Vickerman (2008) these conditions make it advisable to organize public transportation 
beyond the strict municipal boundaries of the central city in the metropolitan area. 
13 EMT also regulates the taxi service through the Metropolitan Taxi Institute (IMET). 
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Figure 1 shows the location of public and private operators in the metropolitan area of 
Barcelona. The red area shows the municipality of Barcelona, which is operated by TMB. The 
rest of the municipalities are served by private operators regulated by EMT. Several 
municipalities outside Barcelona are grouped in the same concession. Finally, the red dots 
indicate the municipalities where TMB also serves certain routes. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Concessions according to operators and municipalities 
 
 
Source: Entitat Metropolitana del Transport. 
 
In recent years, the relevance of private operators has increased: between 2003 and 2006 the 
number of passengers transported by private firms has grown by 18 per cent, while the 
number of passengers transported by TMB has only increased by 2 per cent (Table 4). On the 
other hand, in terms of number of metropolitan routes private firms operate 45 per cent of the 
total.  
 
Table 3. Demand and supply for bus services in the Barcelona metropolitan area, 2006.  
Bus services  Passengers 
(millions) 
Routes  Fleet Operational 
kilometers  
Bus stops 
 
TMB 207.72 
(75%) 
109 
(55%) 
1,066 
(70%) 
42,054 
(62%) 
2,566 
(46%) 
Private Companies 65.68 
(25%) 
88 
(45%) 
466 
(30%) 
26,021 
(38%) 
2,989 
(54%) 
 Source: Data provided by EMT 
 
 
Table 4. Growth in demand (million passengers) for bus services. 
Bus service 2003 2004 2005 2006 Increase 03-06 
TMB 203.7 205.0 205.0 207.7 2.0% 
Private Companies 56.4 59.6 61.6 65.7 16.5% 
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Private Market Share  21.7 22.5 23.1 24.0 10.5% 
  Source: Data provided by EMT.  
 
Table 4 also shows that since 2003 the market share of private management has increased at 
the expense of TMB. Table 5 shows that both the operational km served and the number of 
routes has grown significantly in the case of lines managed by private firms. Therefore, new 
lines in the metropolitan area are contracted out to private operators, instead of extending 
TMB’s network beyond downtown Barcelona. Illustrations of this strategy are the 22.6% 
increase in operational km recorded by private operators between 2003 and 2006, and the 
15.8% rise in the number of lines.  
 
Table 5. Supply growth if TMB and private companies 
Bus service 2003 2004 2005 2006 Increase 03-06 
TMB      
Routes 104 103 103 109 4.8% 
Operational Km 41,468.6 40,937.7 40,985.5 42,054 1.4% 
Private Companies      
Routes 76 77 81 88 15.8% 
Operational Km 21,214 22,049 22,791 26,021 22.6% 
Private Share      
Routes 42.2% 42.8% 44.0% 44.7 5.9% 
Operational Km 33.8% 35.0% 35.7% 38.2% 13.0% 
Source: Data provided by EMT. 
 
The coexistence of public and private operators in the same service jurisdiction is not common 
in Europe, except for the Scandinavian countries. As stated above, one of the advantages of a 
mixed system is the possibility of using benchmarking regulation, which allows the comparison 
of the efficiency of public and private firms. However, in Barcelona, the application of 
benchmarking techniques is limited by the absence of a general regulator for both public and 
private operators.. EMT only coordinates the services provided by TMB and is in charge of 
funding it, but cannot use incentive regulation to minimize costs and enhance quality. TMB 
enjoys considerable freedom to design and plan its services and is not regulated by the 
concession contract. In spite of this, in recent years some indirect benchmarking has been 
present during negotiations with TMB employees regarding their employment conditions. 
 
The absence of a strong control over TMB is the main limitation of the Barcelona model and 
the hardest problem to address, due to political interference on the boards of both EMT and 
TMB. In spite of this, we can still compare the economic efficiency of the private and public 
operators by computing the cost per km driven.14 For TMB’s routes, the cost per km driven is 
4.9 euros, while the average cost for private operators is 3.3 euros. Table 6 shows that in all 
private concessions for which economic data are available, the cost per km driven is lower than 
in the case of TMB. 
 
                                                     
14 It is not possible to compute the cost per vehicle-km or passenger-km, the most commonly used 
ratios in transport economics, because the information is not available. 
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Table 6. Cost per Km driven by concession contract (2006) 
Concessions Cost per Km driven 
C1 2.06 
C2 2.65 
C3 3.11 
C4 3.08 
C5 3.37 
C6 4.28 
C7 3.51 
C8 4.12 
Mean 3.27 
TMB 4.94 
Note: The identity of private operators is preserved for reasons of confidentiality. 
Source: Data provided by EMT and TMB. 
 
Private operators have far less management autonomy than TMB. EMT organizes the 
tendering process, establishes the subsidies that operators receive and implements incentives to 
improve efficiency and to control the quality of the service. In the next section we analyze 
these regulatory instruments. 
 
3.2 Competitive tendering 
 
The tendering procedures in Barcelona consider groups of routes that make up districts, which 
allow concessionaires to cross-subsidize the ones that are unprofitable. EMT tenders different 
types of concessions according to the profitability of the activity and the public service 
obligations imposed on the firms.15 Private operators can bid for three different types of 
contracts: 1) Concessions regulated by public service obligations; 2) Concessions exempt from 
public service obligations; and 3) Profitable concessions that must pay a price to EMT.  
 
The first type of concession is the most frequent and it implies that the bus operator must 
offer a service subject to quality inspection in exchange for a subsidy that covers its losses. 
Therefore, in this case the risks are mainly borne by the local authority. These concessions last 
for five years but can be extended for two or three years more.  
 
The second type of concession was tendered before the 1970s and was not originally subject to 
public service obligations. In this case, concessionaires assume all the risk and are not 
subsidized by EMT.  The duration of these concessions is around 30 years, but many of them 
are about to expire and will be replaced by the first type of contract. In recent years, EMT has 
negotiated with concessionaires the inclusion of several public service obligations to reflect the 
urban and socio-economic needs of the municipalities surrounding Barcelona: for example, 
                                                     
15 The regulation of the sector is based on the Regulation (EC) No/370/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 2 October 2007 on public passenger transport services by rail and by 
road. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                  Document de Treball 2010/09  pàg. 17
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                   Working Paper         2010/09 pag. 17 
EMT has asked for the extension of some routes, or for the increase in the frequency. When 
these modifications have been agreed, EMT has subsidized the costs of the new obligations. 
 
Finally, the third group of concessions is designed for profitable routes. A clear example is the 
route that connects downtown Barcelona and the airport. Under this contract system, the 
operator pays an annual fee to EMT based on its declared revenues. In the last decade, another 
operator called TOMBUS used this type of contract to exploit some high-traffic routes in 
downtown Barcelona, directly competing with TMB, although this firm gave up the concession 
in 2008.  
 
Each time a regulated concession expires, EMT grants a new one via a competitive tendering 
process. Participants in these tenders are usually operators based in Barcelona and in other 
Spanish cities. EMT assesses the offers of firms, taking into account five aspects:  
 1) The economic proposal: operating costs per km and expected rate of return. This is 
an essential element in the assessment of the bid, since the difference between the 
operating costs and the regulated tariff determines the subsidy that the firm must 
receive;  
 2) Expected demand; children, the elderly and the disabled do not pay for urban 
transportation. As a consequence, EMT is interested in knowing the firm’s expected 
demand from paying passengers, because only these passengers will reduce the subsidy 
given to the firm;  
 3) Staff and equipment used in the area of the concession. This information is useful to 
assess efficiency;  
 4) Experience in the sector and ability to exploiting the service; and  
 5) Description of the coaches used to provide the service. 
 
The EMT assesses all the technical and economic aspects of the bids, and assigns a score to 
each of them. Finally, it chooses the concessionaire with the highest score. Private concessions 
are usually awarded for five-year periods, short enough to ensure recurrent competition for the 
market. Besides, the contracts usually include the possibility of an extension of two or more 
years, contingent on the operator’s performance, which is measured taking into account quality 
objectives, launching of marketing campaigns, and acceptance of new objectives. Therefore, 
EMT uses contract duration to incentivize efficiency: first, it establishes short contracts, and 
second it extends the concessions if the operators prove efficient.  
 
As discussed above, a key aspect for the success of a tender process is to guarantee the 
participation of a number of operators. In Barcelona, EMT tries to encourage participation by 
making the market more contestable. When a new firm wins a tender it can use all its 
management abilities to operate the service, but it uses the same staff and equipment as its 
predecessors. As in France and Italy, the regulator owns the bus fleets, or strongly finances 
them. Furthermore, EMT owns two bus garages and is currently building new ones. As a 
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result, vehicles and garages, the most important investments required in the bus industry, are 
provided by EMT. The regulator also establishes that successful bidders must maintain the 
jobs of the employees of their predecessor and also the working conditions. All these measures 
make the market very contestable and eliminate some of Williamson’s criticisms of the 
incompleteness of contracts.  However, it also makes it very difficult for an entrant to offer a 
better bid than the incumbent.  
 
Table 7. Concessions tendered in Barcelona. Entitat Metropolitana del Transport.  
Source: Based on information provided by EMT 
 
Surprisingly, in spite of this tendering strategy,  few incumbent operators have been removed 
in recent years16. Table 7 displays information on recent tenders completed in Barcelona, 
                                                     
16 Boitani and Cambini (2006) and Yvrande-Billon (2006) report the same results for Italy and France. 
Yvrande-Billon (2006) explains that in France between 1995 and 2002, 123 out of 165 tenders led to 
the renewal of the incumbent. She argues that incumbents usually propose better bids than their 
competitors. 
Concession 
(urban area) 
Year of 
tender 
Number 
of 
bidders 
Concession 
length 
Extension  
Incentives 
Economic  
Incentives 
      
Concession with public 
service obligations 
     
Baix Llobregat 1996 3 5 No Yes 
      
Hospitalet  1991 1 5 No No 
 2001 5 5 4 years Yes 
      
Sant Feliu 1998 4 5 4 years Yes 
      
Esplugues 1993 2 5 No No 
 1998 3 5 No No 
      
El Prat 2006 3 2 3 years No 
      
Barcelonès Nord (day service) 1998 4 8 4 years Yes 
      
Barcelonès Nord 
(night service) 
1998 4 5 3 years Yes 
 2006 2 5 2 years Yes 
      
Concessions that have agreed 
to include some general 
service obligations 
     
Castelldefels 1994 4 n.a n.a. No 
      
St. Boi-Cornellà 2003 1 n.a n.a No 
      
Viladecans 2001 1 n.a No No 
      
Gavà 1995 1 n.a No No 
 2002 1 n.a No No 
      
Profitable Concessions       
Airport (Aerobus) 1990 4 10 No No 
      
Tombús 1990 6 10 No No 
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paying special attention to the number of bidders and the type of contract awarded. Even 
though an average of four firms have participated in the bidding process, concessions have 
always been awarded to the incumbents, probably due to their greater efficiency. In addition, 
the scoring system used by EMT may also benefit incumbents because the proposals are 
valued taking into account the firm's reputation and previous experience. However, direct 
inspection of the bidding documents has revealed that entrants only made a lower economic 
offer in two out of nine tender processes.  
 
3.3 Concession regulation 
 
EMT defines the characteristics of the service offered by the concessionaires, establishes 
network routes, fares and quality levels, and organizes the tenders. 
 
Concessions of private firms are given incentives to improve efficiency and quality. The first 
contracts designed by EMT only included a subsidy equal to the difference between the firm’s 
operating costs and the revenues generated. More recently, however, several incentives have 
been added to the contracts to improve concessionaires’ performance. 
 
The subsidy offered to concessionaires with public service obligations is computed taking into 
account the net loss of operating the service, L, and a set of variables, G, that reflect their 
efficiency: 
  soetfo GGGGICC
GLS


 
The net loss of operating the service, L, reflects the operating costs, oC , plus the financial cost 
of the equipment not supplied by EMT, fC , minus the ordinary and extraordinary revenues 
obtained by the firm, I. The firm's operating costs cover the wages of drivers and other 
employees, petrol, energy and other costs expenses. These costs depend mainly on the 
evolution of wages, oil prices, and the retail prices index.  
 
G comprises a variety of instruments designed to improve the conduct of regulated firms. 
First, tG  reflects the number of paying passengers served by the firm that do not benefit from 
social tariffs. If the concessionaire carries out marketing campaigns that increase the number 
of passengers paying the regular price, it receives a percentage of the additional revenues 
generated. Second, eG  shows the extraordinary revenues attracted by the firm, for example 
through advertisements or by the sale of old vehicles. The concessionaire obtains one third of 
the total revenues generated in this way.17  
 
                                                     
17 This type of revenue sharing regulation has also been used in other network industries such as 
telecommunications (Sappington and Weisman, 1996, Ai and Sappington, 2002).
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Finally, oG  reflects the quality of the service measured through objective instruments and 
sG shows users’ impressions of service quality, measured through direct interviews. One of the 
main concerns in privatizing the provision of bus services is that private concessionaires may 
lower the quality of the service in order to reduce costs (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997: Levin 
and Tadelis, 2010). To avoid this, EMT incorporates several quality indicators in the 
compensating mechanism offered to the firm. It measures objective quality on the basis of 
objectives such as punctuality, regularity, interior cleanliness of vehicles, information, customer 
services, and driving quality. Subjective or perceived quality is measured through interviews 
asking users about timetable coordination and transfers, customer services, punctuality, driving 
quality, comfort of vehicles, adequacy of stops, cleanliness of vehicles and information 
received in case of a timetable or route modification.  
 
Concessions not subject to public service obligations were initially not regulated through these 
mechanisms. In recent years, however, most of the concessions have been modified to extend 
the routes or to provide greater frequency. In these cases, EMT offers the same type of 
subsidies as the ones described above.   
 
Finally, in the case of profitable routes (today, only the downtown Barcelona - airport route), 
EMT receives a fixed percentage of the firm's total revenues. In this particular case, the firm is 
in charge of providing all human and material equipment.  
 
Table 8. Comparison between contracts with and without incentives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Based on information provided by EMT 
 
But do these incentives work? Table 8 offers an initial appraisal by comparing concessions 
with and without incentive contracts. Considering the concessions operated by the same 
producer over time, we can compare their mean performance before and after the introduction 
of incentive schemes. By doing so, we find that on average the concessionaires obtained a 
larger increase in paying passengers and in extraordinary revenues after the introduction of 
incentives. Also, by comparing different concessions operated by the same firm – for example, 
Esplugues and St. Feliu – we observe that contracts with incentives provide higher increases in 
paying passengers, extraordinary revenues, and quality. In fact, in recent years the average 
quality – both service and on-vehicle – has increased significantly (Figure 2). 
 Without 
incentives 
With 
incentives 
SAME CONCESSION, SAME OPERATOR  
1995-2002 
 
2002-2006 
Annual Average Increase of Passengers 1.7% 7.0% 
Annual Average Increase of Paying Passengers -1.6% 7.0% 
Annual Average Increase of Extraordinary Revenues 30% 155% 
  
SAME OPERATOR, DIFFERENT CONCESSION 
 
1998-2006 
(Esplugues) 
1998 -2006 
(St. Feliu) 
Annual Average Increase of Passengers 46% 110% 
Annual Average Increase of Payment Passengers 59% 86% 
Annual Average Increase of Extraordinary Revenues 33% 65% 
Increase  of Subjective Quality Indicator -3% 2% 
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Figure 2. Service and on-vehicle quality of regulated private operators.  
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Service quality On-vehicle quality
 
Source: Entitat Metropolitana del Transport. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The exceptional mixed public-private structure of the urban bus market in the metropolitan 
area of Barcelona provides an interesting context in which to analyze the management 
challenges and opportunities of partial privatization. As regards metropolitan transportation 
governance, the presence of a large number of sub-areas in the metropolitan area of Barcelona 
has facilitated the contracting out of the service in certain municipalities. This is consistent 
with the scale and density characteristics of urban bus services that allow market 
fragmentation.  
 
One of the key features of the EMT’s regulatory model in Barcelona have been the 
establishment of short-term concessions and the removal of entry barriers by maintaining the 
public ownership of bus fleets and bus garages. These measures have great potential for 
increasing competition in the market and for improving efficiency. Short contracts and the 
possibility of expanding the concessions have helped to avoid opportunistic behavior by 
incumbents and have increased efficiency. Other essential aspects of the Barcelona model are 
the incentives and penalizations introduced in the last decade in the contract design. An 
illustration of the effects of these policies is the fact that costs per km driven are lower in all 
private concessions than in the government-owned company: an average of 3.3 euros versus 
4.9 euros. Similarly, incentives of private operators’ contracts have produced significant 
improvements in attracting paying passengers, extraordinary revenues, and quality. 
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Another interesting result of the Barcelona regulatory model is the growth in the share of 
routes managed by private firms, from 33.8% in 2003 to 38.2% in 2006. These practices may 
also have positive effects on the performance of TMB, because the threat of privatization of 
either additional or new routes is more credible if private providers are already operating in the 
area. And a credible threat of privatization may well stimulate performance improvements by 
public managers (Hatry, 1988; Bel, 2006; Bel, Fageda & Warner, 2010). In fact, the local 
government used this tool to confront a tough strike by TMB workers in late 2007-early 2008. 
 
Even without alternation in the concessions and the geographical distribution of operators 
(Figure 1), the regulatory framework implemented by EMT has reduced entry barriers and has 
empowered it to enforce the strict fulfillment of contracts. Under an inherently incomplete 
contract framework, EMT is particularly interested in achieving bargaining power to negotiate 
the aspects that are difficult to include in a contract but are important for the management of 
the network. This bargaining power may allow EMT to complement format and relational 
contracting (Brown, Potosky and Van Slyke, 2006; and Poppo and Zenger, 2002). The 
advantages of using relational contracting in the bus services has been stressed by Didier Van 
de Velde (2007), because in many circumstances it is important to focus more on agreement 
about the contracting process rather than to attempt to draw up complete contracts. Further 
research on the use of relational contracting in the case of the Barcelona bus transportation 
system is likely to provide valuable new insights. 
 
In all, the case of governance reform in the Barcelona urban bus service provides an 
interesting illustration of how partial privatization and competitive pressures can be used to 
provide more flexibility in the provision of the service and to impose discipline on the public 
operator. In turn, competitive pressures in the bidding process can be used to discipline private 
providers and to increase the bargaining power of the regulator. This type of reform is of 
interest to all metropolitan areas large enough to operate under constant returns to scale 
regime, and suitable for potential concessions of routes in segregated areas of the metropolitan 
area, so as not to miss out on the benefits of economies of density.  
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